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Auto-Enrollment Retirement Plans for the People: Choices and Outcomes in 
OregonSaves 
Abstract 
Oregon recently launched an automatic-enrollment retirement savings program for private sector workers 
who lack access to other workplace retirement plans. We analyze participation choices, account 
balances, and inflow/outflow data using administrative records between August 2018 and April 2020. 
Within the small to mid-sized firms served by OregonSaves, estimated average after-tax earnings are low 
($2,365 per month) and turnover rates are high (38.2% per year). We find that younger employees and 
employees in larger firms are less likely to opt out, but that participation rates fall over time. The most 
common reason given for opting out is “I can’t afford to save at this time,” but the second most common 
is “I have my own retirement plan.” At the end of April 2020, 67,731 accounts had positive account 
balances, holding $51.1 million in total assets. The average balance is $754, but there is considerable 
dispersion, with younger workers accumulating the fewest assets due to higher rates of job turnover. 
Overall, we conclude that OregonSaves has meaningfully increased employee savings by reducing search 
costs. The 34.3% of workers with positive account balances in April 2020 is comparable to the marginal 
increase in participation at larger firms in the private sector. Nevertheless, there are significant 
constraints to the savings that auto-enrollment savings plans can achieve when provided to workers in 
industries and firms with low wages, volatile wages, and high turnover. Our evidence suggests that 
employees who are opting out of OregonSaves are often doing so for rational reasons. 
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Oregon recently launched an automatic-enrollment retirement savings program for private 
sector workers who lack access to other workplace retirement plans. We analyze participation 
choices, account balances, and inflow/outflow data using administrative records between 
August 2018 and April 2020. Within the small to mid-sized firms served by OregonSaves, 
estimated average after-tax earnings are low ($2,365 per month) and turnover rates are high 
(38.2% per year). We find that younger employees and employees in larger firms are less 
likely to opt out, but that participation rates fall over time. The most common reason given 
for opting out is “I can’t afford to save at this time,” but the second most common is “I have 
my own retirement plan.” At the end of April 2020, 67,731 accounts had positive account 
balances, holding $51.1 million in total assets. The average balance is $754, but there is 
considerable dispersion, with younger workers accumulating the fewest assets due to higher 
rates of job turnover. Overall, we conclude that OregonSaves has meaningfully increased 
employee savings by reducing search costs. The 34.3% of workers with positive account 
balances in April 2020 is comparable to the marginal increase in participation at larger firms 
in the private sector. Nevertheless, there are significant constraints to the savings that auto-
enrollment savings plans can achieve when provided to workers in industries and firms with 
low wages, volatile wages, and high turnover. Our evidence suggests that employees who are 
opting out of OregonSaves are often doing so for rational reasons.   
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 Only about half of the U.S. private-sector workforce is currently covered by an employer-
sponsored retirement plan, a fact that has sparked debate over whether there is a national 
“retirement crisis.”1 In response, a growing number of states has mandated that private-sector firms 
offer retirement saving accounts to their employees.2 Oregon was among the first, passing a bill in 
2015 launching the mandatory OregonSaves program, which is structured as a Roth IRA with 
automatic enrollment. OregonSaves’ explicit goal is to boost workers’ personal retirement savings 
and thereby decrease dependency on Social Security and means-tested social transfers.3 In this 
paper, we examine who opted out of OregonSaves and why, how the program affected saving 
patterns for participating employees, and whether it seems likely to meaningfully increase 
retirement savings for participants.  
 A key rationale offered to justify state-based mandatory automatic enrollment retirement 
plans is that the vast majority of workers lacking access to employer-sponsored retirement plans 
has no dedicated retirement saving vehicles.4 According to the 2014 Summary of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), only 22.1% of employees working at a firm without a pension plan 
had opened an IRA, and only 7.6% were actively contributing. In other words, while workers who 
lack employer-sponsored retirement plans could respond by opening and funding their own 
Traditional or Roth IRAs, the vast majority do not, resulting in few accumulated retirement assets. 
Whether we should expect Oregon’s state-sponsored retirement plan to significantly increase 
                                                 
1 See Miller et al. (2015) and rebuttals by Biggs and Schieber (2015, 2019a, 2019b). Also see Bee and Mitchell (2017). 
2 OregonSaves and Illinois’ Secure Choice began enrolling employees in 2017; California’s CalSavers began enrolling 
employees in July 2019. As of December 2020, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey have also taken 
steps to offer a state-sponsored IRA featuring automatic enrollment.  
3 The program’s official designation is the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan, referenced in the enabling legislation and 
Oregon Revised Statutes 178.200-178.245. See Belbase and Sanzenbacher (2018) and Bradford (2017) for additional 
discussion.  
4 See, for example, Gale and John (2018). Biggs (2016) notes some of the difficulties in measuring pension coverage 






retirement savings among this population depends crucially on why workers are not already 
saving. 
 In what follows, we examine three non-mutually exclusive explanations for the dearth of 
employee-initiated retirement savings, which we refer to as the “search costs,” “can’t afford to 
save,” and “don’t need to save” hypotheses. The search costs hypothesis posits that the 
introduction of an automatic-enrollment retirement plan will increase the fraction of workers 
contributing to a retirement savings account by eliminating the search cost associated with learning 
about and enrolling in an IRA.5 Because prior research has shown that earnings, financial literacy, 
and the extent of retirement planning are positively correlated (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; 
Clark et al. 2017), these search costs may be particularly large within the sample of workers 
targeted by OregonSaves.6 Furthermore, studies of participant behavior in employer-provided 
401(k) plans find that the younger, lower-paid, and less educated workers are more likely to adopt 
default savings rates and invest through default investment options (e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001; 
Mitchell and Utkus 2012; Chalmers and Reuter 2020). Therefore, if search costs are a primary 
reason that many workers are not already saving for retirement, the introduction of an automatic-
enrollment retirement savings plan is likely to result in high participation rates at the default saving 
rate and significant incremental retirement savings. Evidence in Célerier and Matray (2019) that 
increased bank branch supply leads to greater wealth and net-worth accumulation in low-income 
households implies that supply-side solutions to low savings rates, such as OregonSaves, may lead 
to improved welfare. 
 A second hypothesis is that workers targeted by OregonSaves cannot afford to save for 
                                                 
5 Madrian and Shea (2001) were the first to demonstrate that the introduction of automatic enrollment could 
significantly increase participation rates within an existing single employer 401(k) plan. 
6 Carlin, et. al. (2013) make the theoretical argument that default features, similar to those in OregonSaves, that reduce 






retirement.7 Many households report that they have difficulty meeting even basic expenses. For 
example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2019: page 21) found that “17 
percent of adults expected to forgo payment on some of their bills in the month of the survey.” 
Such statistics suggest that the marginal utility of consumption is high for many low-income 
workers, causing them rationally to prioritize consumption over retirement savings. The larger the 
fraction of workers who cannot afford to save, the lower the optimal participation rate, and the 
higher the expected opt out rate.  
 The third hypothesis for low pre-existing savings rates is that workers do not believe that 
additional savings will improve their welfare. Because Social Security benefit replacement rates 
are relatively high for low-income workers, lower-paid employees at firms lacking employer-
sponsored retirement plans may rationally decide to consume more, rather than increasing their 
retirement savings.8 In addition, low-income workers may not intend ever to retire. Like those that 
cannot afford to save, employees who believe there is insufficient value to additional retirement 
savings are likely to opt out at high rates (as are the small fraction of employees who already 
contribute to an IRA). 
The introduction of OregonSaves allows us to determine how workers who previously 
lacked access to workplace retirement plans respond when an automatic-enrollment retirement 
savings plan is introduced. While there have been numerous studies of automatic enrollment in 
                                                 
7 For example, Bronchetti, et al. (2011) find that low income taxpayers receiving a tax refund are not substantially 
more likely to save their refund when saving is offered as opt out versus opt in.  They do find, however, that savings 
take-up rates rise when refunds are larger.   
8 The CBO (2019: p. 18) finds that “replacement rate based on all earnings from age 22 through age 61 is 80 percent 
for workers born in the 1960s whose lifetime earnings fall in the lowest earnings quintile, more than double the 34 
percent for workers whose earnings fall in the highest quintile.” At the same time, it is not clear that lower income 
households accurately estimate their Social Security benefits. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) find that knowledge of 
social security benefits is negatively correlated with lifetime income and wealth.  For example, in the first and second 
lifetime income deciles, only 11.2% and 16.3% of respondents provide estimates of their Social Security Benefits that 






large firms offering 401(k) plans, we know little about whether such evidence will generalize to 
lower-income workers employed by smaller firms that do not offer their own retirement savings 
plans.9 Our analysis of individual-level administrative data thus sheds light on participation 
decisions, contribution rates, and the evolution of account balances, as well as the reasons that 
employees give for opting out of OregonSaves.  
 Importantly, these data allow us to examine the relative importance of our three hypotheses 
regarding why some workers do not save. If the low pre-existing levels of retirement saving are 
primarily due to high search costs, then we anticipate finding relatively high participation rates 
under OregonSaves and persistent contributions. In addition, since the program mandates a 5% 
default saving rate, if this is perceived by OregonSaves participations to be a “recommended” 
savings rate, we expect little variation in observed savings rates. However, if low pre-existing 
levels of retirement saving are primarily due to workers’ inability (or perceived lack of need) to 
save for retirement, then we anticipate finding low participation rates and low saving rates, 
especially among workers with lower and more volatile earnings profiles.10 
Our analysis of account-level data from August 2018 through April 30, 2020 provides 
evidence that all three hypotheses play a role in participants’ behavior. Consistent with the search 
cost hypothesis, OregonSaves is generating savings for a substantial number of employees: in fact, 
more than 67,700 employees accumulated over $51 million dollars through April 2020 (and $79.1 
million through November 2020; CRR 2020). However, consistent with significant liquidity 
constraints, even our upper bound participation rate estimate of 62.4% is significantly below the 
                                                 
9 Madrian and Shea (2001) and Stock and Wise (1990) focused on participant behavior within the retirement plan of 
a single large firm. Studies of participant behavior across multiple firms, such as Carroll et al. (2009) and Mitchell 
and Utkus (2012), have examined firms offering company-based 401(k) or 403(b) retirement plans.  
10 Carroll et al. (2009: 1668) pointed to the benefit of active decision-making with respect to savings rates under the 
assumption that desired savings rates likely vary across employees regardless of their financial literacy levels. Yet 
given evidence on the depth of financial illiteracy, they concluded that “[w]ell-chosen defaults are likely to be superior 






levels observed in studies of firm-sponsored 401(k) plans, likely reflecting our finding that 
employers targeted by OregonSaves are disproportionately in industries with lower wages, more 
volatile wages, and higher levels of job turnover. The lower bound estimated participation rate, 
based on those having a positive account balance, is 34.3%.11 Furthermore, 30.3% of those who 
opt out say they do so because they “can’t afford to save,” and the likelihood of stating this is 
significantly higher in those industries with lower average wages. The fact that OregonSaves is 
targeting a low-income population that has not traditionally been served by workplace retirement 
saving accounts in the United States argues against focusing solely on participation rates when 
evaluating its success. Indeed, in some cases, the welfare of low-income workers might be 
improved by opting out of the plan until their budget constraints relax.  
Consistent with the “don’t need to save” hypothesis, 23.9% of those who opt out state that 
“I have my own retirement plan,” and this answer is relatively more likely among employees in 
higher-wage industries. While this is the second most common reason given for opting out, it 
suggests that only 9.7% of the workers targeted by OregonSaves have an existing IRA or 401(k) 
plan, versus 22.1% in the SIPP dataset.12 This difference likely arises from the fact that 
OregonSaves serves a lower-income population than is included by SIPP. It also suggests that 
there is relatively little scope for OregonSaves to crowd out existing retirement plan contributions. 
 To shed additional light on who is the most likely to participate in OregonSaves, we focus 
on the cross-section of employees three months after their initial eligibility date (which is 
determined by the month when their employer first provides their data to OregonSaves). We find 
                                                 
11 Quinby, et al. (2020) use OregonSaves data for September 2018 to September 2019 to calculate participation rates. 
Their lower bound estimate (based on positive account balances) is 48 percent and their upper bound estimate (based 
on a positive saving rate) is 67 percent. In part, our rates are lower because all of their calculations condition on active 
employees at employers that have made at least one contribution into OregonSaves. 






that younger employees are less likely to opt out, as are employees who have already been exposed 
to OregonSaves through a prior job, who work in larger firms, and who work at firms that have 
already made payroll contributions to OregonSaves.13 Conversely, and consistent with perceived 
liquidity constraints, opt out rates are higher when the local unemployment rate is higher, or when 
our industry-level measure of income volatility is higher. Employees who are terminated are less 
likely to opt out but also less likely to accumulate any assets during this three-month window, a 
phenomenon that drives a wedge between formal opt out rates and participation rates inferred from 
positive account balances. 
While there has been a steady increase in assets under management, there is considerable 
dispersion in OregonSaves account balances. When we focus on the set of employees with at least 
one contribution into OregonSaves, the average account balance is $754, and the average monthly 
account-level inflow is $117. Yet the fraction of accounts with any inflows falls from 65.6% in 
August 2018 to 34.4% in April 2020, a pattern which is largely driven by job turnover. Monthly 
account-level outflows are far less common (impacting 2-3% of accounts per month), but they are 
much larger in magnitude. The average outflow rose from $355 in August 2018 to $590 in April 
2020.14 When we compare employees who are classified by their employers as being active in 
month t, to those who are not, we find predictable differences in asset accumulation. Employees 
active 18 months after their initial contribution have an average account balance of $1,132 
(including $0s), versus $370 for those classified as inactive. The fact that the youngest employees 
(age 18-25) are the least likely to remain active explains why they accumulate the least assets 
($487 at month 18, versus $980 to $1,186 for those age 36-75). While our ability to measure the 
                                                 
13 About half of the firms in our sample have not initiated payroll transfers to OregonSaves. 
14 The Roth IRA and modest earnings on the default money market fund for the first $1,000 of investments reduces 






impact of COVID-19 related economic shocks is limited by the fact that our data end in April 
2020, we do find a 13.9% drop in the likelihood of any inflows in April 2020. This drop is 
consistent with large job losses that month not yet reflected in the employee job status variable. 
More generally, we find that the likelihood of withdrawals spike following job turnover, 
suggesting that withdrawals from OregonSaves are used to smooth consumption.15 
Overall, we conclude that OregonSaves has meaningfully increased employee savings by 
reducing search costs. The 34.3% of workers with positive account balances in April 2020 is 
comparable to the marginal increase in participation of around 30% in the large firm examined by 
Madrian and Shea (2001). Nevertheless, there are significant constraints to the savings that auto-
enrollment savings plans can achieve when provided to workers in industries and firms with low 
wages, volatile wages, and high turnover. Our evidence suggests that employees who are opting 
out of OregonSaves are often doing so for rational reasons. 
II. Institutional Details 
OregonSaves is structured as a Roth Individual Retirement Account (IRA) with automatic 
enrollment and a default after-tax contribution rate of 5%. Although similar to privately-managed 
employer-sponsored 401(k) and 403(b) retirement plans, there are four important differences. 
First, all private-sector firms without existing employer-sponsored retirement plans are required 
to enroll their employees in the state-sponsored plan. Second, unlike most plans featuring 
automatic enrollment, there is no scope for an employer match; contributions are limited to those 
made by the employee. Third, when a worker moves from one OregonSaves-participating 
employer to another, contributions flow to the same account, reducing the likelihood of multiple 
                                                 
15 Quinby, et. al. (2020) use data for September 2018 to September 2019 to classify participants into five categories. 






accounts with small balances. Fourth, by default, the first $1,000 deposited into the OregonSaves 
account is invested in a money market fund, with contributions above that threshold automatically 
invested in an age-based target date fund (TDF). One appealing feature of this plan design is that 
participants can access a substantial portion of their money without risk of tax penalty, allowing 
OregonSaves to function as both a liquid savings account and a retirement savings plan.16 
While the default saving rate in OregonSaves is 5% of each paycheck, participants may 
select any (integer) contribution rate between 0% and 100%.17 In addition, OregonSaves features 
automatic escalation, with the saving rate increasing by 1 percentage point on January of each 
calendar year, up to a maximum of 10 percent. Participants may override the default asset 
allocation scheme by selecting any investment(s) from the state-determined menu which includes 
a money market fund, a suite of target date funds, and the State Street Equity 500 Index Fund.  
The OregonSaves program was rolled out to employers in seven waves. The first wave 
consisted of firms volunteering to be in the pilot program, followed by six compulsory waves of 
decreasing employer size. The largest firms (100+ employees) began the compulsory registration 
period on October 1, 2017. The smallest firms (4 or fewer employees) were scheduled to start 
enrolling May 12, 2020, but the deadline was then pushed to January 15, 2021, due to the COVID-
19 pandemic. Nevertheless, smaller firms were allowed to register employees before their official 
wave and, because of the lack penalties for non-participation, some large, reluctant employers may 
still have not registered.18 
                                                 
16 As with other Roth IRAs, participants can withdraw contributions (but not investment returns) without penalty up 
to age 59 ½, or in the event of a qualifying disability or for first-time home buyers. 
17 Up to the legal limit for Roth IRA contributions, which in 2019 were $6,000 per year (or $7,000 for those age 50+); 
OregonSaves (2019).  
18 Firms which offer their own retirement plans are exempted from the mandate to offer the OregonSaves platform. 
All other employers are required to register, though penalties for failing to register were to be implemented from 
January 2020 (later postponed due to the pandemic). According to Senate Bill 164, “the Commissioner of the Bureau 
of Labor and Industries may assess against an employer who has engaged in an unlawful practice under section 2 of 






 OregonSaves provides employers with a pre-designed plan and safe harbor from fiduciary 
responsibility, thereby reducing set-up and monitoring costs.19 Once an employer is registered, it 
submits employee names, social security numbers, and dates of birth to OregonSaves, which 
commences a 30-day enrollment period. If an employee does not opt out during the first 15 days, 
OregonSaves attempts to verify her tax identification number and, if successful, opens an 
individual Roth IRA for her at the end of the 30-day window. At that point, employers can direct 
contributions to OregonSaves. After registering, employers are also able to provide updates to 
participants’ employment status to the OregonSaves administrator.  
III. OregonSaves Participant and Plan Statistics 
 In this section, we present summary statistics for OregonSaves-covered employers and 
employees. We have obtained anonymized individual-level monthly administrative data for all 
workers who had access to the program through April 2020, including workers who opted out of 
OregonSaves during the enrollment window, those who stopped contributing before the end of our 
sample period, and those who have yet to contribute. The dataset includes employee-level 
information on age, saving rates, and employer, as well as account-level information on monthly 
contributions and withdrawals and asset allocation.20 We also possess employer-level information 
on industry and firm size, and the date on which each employer first directs employee contributions 
to OregonSaves.21 
                                                 
developed under ORS 178.205, not to exceed an aggregate amount of $5,000 in a calendar year.” Senate Bill 164 was 
signed into law by Governor Kate Brown on May 22, 2019.  
See https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2019R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB164/Enrolled. 
19 Scott and Hines (2020) survey OregonSaves’ participating employers and find that approximately 80% of 
participating employers report no out of pocket costs associated with the program. 
20 In this section, our unit of observation is the employer-employee pair. Because individual employees can be enrolled 
into OregonSaves by multiple employers, they can be assigned multiple employee identification codes; however, they 
can only have one OregonSaves account.  
21 Because our data are derived from a number of sources including information entered by employers, employees, 






 Table 1 shows the total number of employers and employer-employee pairs covered by the 
OregonSaves program. Column (1) presents the cumulative number of employers that uploaded 
employee information to the OregonSaves administrator by the end of each month between August 
2018 and April 2020. Column (2) presents the subset of employers that processed payroll for at 
least one employee by the end of each month. By the end of April 2020, 11,088 employers had 
registered their employees with OregonSaves, but only 5,537 had directed any contributions to 
OregonSaves. Some portion of this gap can be explained by the fact that processing payroll takes 
time and many employers registered at the end of 2019.  
Table 1 here 
 Column (3) reports the cumulative number of employees whose names had been provided 
by their employers to the OregonSaves administrators. Approximately 289,657 employees have 
engaged at some level with OregonSaves by the end of our sample period, including employees 
who opted out of the program. Column (4) reports the subset of employees whose employers have 
directed a contribution to OregonSaves, showing that by April 2020, 226,178 employees are 
working (or were previously working) at employers that processed OregonSaves contributions for 
at least one employee. By comparing columns (1) and (2) in April 2020, we observe that 
approximately half of all employers have not processed payroll. However, by comparing columns 
(3) and (4) in April 2020, we see that nearly 80% of all registered employees work at employers 
that have begun directing employee contributions to OregonSaves, thus making positive account 
balances possible. 
 Column (5) reports the cumulative number of employees classified by the administrator as 
both eligible to participate and actively working. Employees are eligible to participate if the initial 
                                                 
accounts due to errors such as age being outside the range of 18 to 100, or contributions being negative. All of the 






30-day enrollment window closes and their identities are verified. The administrator includes a 
flag indicating whether an employee is active or inactive in month t. For over 93% of the employee-
months classified as inactive, we observe a reason that the employee is inactive (e.g., terminated, 
seasonal layoff, or deceased). Because the administrator only updates an employee’s status when 
an employer updates it with OregonSaves, the sample of eligible and active employees almost 
certainly overstates the number of employees still employed in month t.  Column (6) reports the 
cumulative number of eligible and active employees whose employers have processed 
contributions, which is the maximum number of employees who could feasibly contribute to 
OregonSaves each month.  
 Column (7) reports the cumulative number of employees with a positive account balance 
at the end of each month, while column (8) reports the cumulative number of employees with an 
open account in month t with a positive account balance during any portion of our sample period 
(even if the positive balance occurs after month t). The difference of 8,728 between columns (7) 
and (8) in April 2020 represents the number of employee-employer pairs that made contributions 
into OregonSaves but subsequently withdrew their entire balances.22  
 A common measure of retirement plan efficacy is the participation rate. Madrian and Shea 
(2001) reported that automatic enrollment in one large 401(k) plan of a large relatively high-wage 
firm resulted in a participation rate of 85.9%, with the largest increases being for younger, lower-
income workers. Mindful of the fact that we are measuring participation rates in a set of firms 
having lower pay and higher turnover, we offer two different measures of participation in Table 1. 
The Global Participation Rate is the number of employees with current positive account balances 
                                                 
22 Note that the totals in columns (7) and (8) slightly overstate the total number of unique accounts. This is because a 
participant who works for two different employers during our sample period will appear as two employee-employer 






(column (7)) divided by the total number of employees ever entered into the OregonSaves system 
by employers who processed payroll (column (4)). The Global Participation Rate is 34.3% at the 
end of our sample period. The Global Participation Rate decreases as more employees formally 
opt out, as more employees set their savings rate to zero, as more employees become inactive due 
to job turnover, and as more employees who previously contributed into OregonSaves withdraw 
their account balances.  
Our second measure is the Feasible Participation Rate, defined as the number of 
employees who have a positive account balance at some point during our sample period (column 
(8)) divided by the number of number of active, eligible employees working at employers who 
already processed contributions (column (6)). Thus, the Feasible Participation Rate measures the 
proportion of employees that could, with near certainty, show up as participants in OregonSaves 
since they are active, eligible, and are with an employer directing contributions to OregonSaves. 
The Feasible Participation Rate is 62.4% at the end of our sample period. While both participation 
rates are considerably lower than the 85.9% estimated by Madrian and Shea (2001), they represent 
significant increases relative to the counterfactual participation rates within the population of low-
income workers targeted by OregonSaves, which are arguably close to zero. If we assume that the 
marginal impact of OregonSaves on retirement participation is on the order of 30%, this is similar 
in magnitude to the average causal estimate of the impact of automatic enrollment in Madrian and 
Shea, despite the absence of any employer match.   
 Table 2 presents employee-level summary statistics by industry, using panel data through 
April 2020. Columns (1) and (2) show the number of employees by industry and the number of 
eligible and active employees working at firms that have processed payroll. The largest industries 






our understanding that a large number of the health care workers can best be described as home-
health care workers.  
Table 2 here 
We report summary statistics in columns (3) through (11) for the entire sample of 289,657 
employee-employer pairs. Age is defined as the calendar year in which the employee first appears 
in the administrative data minus the stated year of birth. We report the mean, median, and 
interquartile (25th to 75th) range. The average age for employees who had access to OregonSaves 
(including participants and those who opted out) is 36 (median is 33).  
Two measures of job turnover rates are provided. Annual turnover equals one if the 
employee was classified as “terminated,” on “seasonal layoff,” or “out of business,” 12 months 
after becoming eligible to contribute (based on one observation per employee with at least 12 
months of OregonSaves administrative data). Similarly, monthly turnover equals one if the 
employee was “active” in month t-1 but classified as “terminated,” on “seasonal layoff,” or “out 
of business” in month t (where the unit of observations is now employee-employer-month). The 
classification of employees’ job status is provided to the administrator by employers. To the extent 
that employers fail to update job status in a timely manner, our estimated turnover rates will 
understate actual turnover rates.23 Despite this caveat, there is a positive correlation between the 
number of employees within each industry and the turnover rate, which suggests OregonSaves 
covers many contingent and temporary workers who usually lack access to employment-based 
defined contribution plans.  
We estimate monthly after-tax earnings at the employee-month level as the total monthly 
contributions divided by the current savings rate (e.g., $100 after-tax contribution divided by 5% 
                                                 
23 In unreported results, we find employers that have not yet processed payroll are significantly less likely to report 






implies $2,000 in after-tax income). Monthly earnings can be estimated only for the subset of 
employees who made positive contributions to their accounts. The mean, median, and interquartile 
range within the full sample are $2,365, $1,883, and $1,960, respectively. Employees in the largest 
industries represented in OregonSaves, such as business support, food services, and health care, 
have monthly earnings lower than the average of the entire OregonSaves workforce. The 
correlation between industry-level monthly turnover rates and industry-level mean monthly 
earnings is -0.52, implying that lower-income jobs have higher turnover rates. Finally, we report 
the within-employee standard deviation of monthly earnings, calculated at the employee level 
using all months with positive contributions within each employee-employer pair (i.e., we exclude 
any months without contributions). The average per person monthly volatility of earnings is $945, 
or nearly half the mean after-tax earnings of $2,365. This high level of volatility illustrates that the 
average participant in OregonSaves faces substantial monthly income uncertainty. 
IV. Cross-sectional Evidence on OregonSaves Opt Out Rates and Account Balances 
Having shown that OregonSaves is extending access to the new savings plan to workers in 
low-income, high-turnover industries, we next analyze opt out decisions. If the “search cost” 
hypothesis dominates, we expect to find low opt out rates, aside from those who already have a 
retirement savings plan. Under the “can’t afford to save” and “don’t need to save” hypotheses, we 
expect to observe higher opt out rates among employees in industries with lower wages and higher 
turnover.24 
In Table 3, we focus on each employee three months after her initial month of eligibility, 
which is defined as the first month in which she would become eligible to contribute into 
                                                 
24 The fact that we cannot measure income unless an employee contributes to OregonSaves prompts us to focus on 






OregonSaves if she has not formally opted out, is still employed, and has had her identity 
successfully verified.25 The total number of employees reported in column (1) is lower than Tables 
1 and 2 because the relevant month for some employees is before August 2018 or after April 2020.  
Table 3 here 
 Column (2) reports that, on average, 40.9% of employees formally opt out of OregonSaves 
within three months of their initial eligibility dates. The correlation between the industry-level opt 
out rate and the mean industry-level earnings in Table 2 is 0.73, suggesting that industries with 
higher earnings levels are more likely to opt out of OregonSaves. While this correlation is broadly 
consistent with evidence that lower-paid employees are more likely to accept default options (as 
in Chalmers and Reuter, 2020, and Mitchell and Utkus, 2012), it runs counter to the “can’t afford 
to save” hypothesis.   
 At our request, the administrator asked employees who formally opted out to provide a 
reason for doing so. Conditional on opting out, 30.3% of employees respond that they cannot afford 
to save, while 25.9% say that they already have a retirement plan. The across-industry correlation 
between “can’t afford to save” and mean earnings is -0.52, while the across-industry correlation 
between “already have a plan” and mean earnings is 0.24. In other words, conditional on opting 
out, employees in lower-paying industries are more likely to cite lack of income and less likely to 
cite having an existing retirement account.  
 In addition to summarizing the fraction of employees who formally opt out, we also use 
account balances at the same point in time to shed light on participation rates. Columns (5) through 
(7) report the fractions of all employees lacking an account, having an open account with a balance 
                                                 
25 In Online Appendix Table 2, we document that the formal opt out rate does not change significantly after month 
three. In Online Appendix Table 3, we report the month three opt out rate separately for each month. It is slightly 






of $0, and having an open account with a positive balance, respectively. Overall, the fraction of 
employees with no account three months after their initial eligibility date is 71.9%. This includes 
people who opt out, cannot have their identities verified, are no longer employed when the 
employer begins directing contributions to OregonSaves, or are employed by a firm that has not 
begun directing contributions to OregonSaves. Of the remaining employees, 26.7% have a positive 
balance and 1.4% have a $0 balance.  
 The remaining columns report the mean, median, and interquartile range of the account 
balance for the subset of employees with positive account balances three months after becoming 
eligible to contribute. Average balances after three months of eligibility range from a low of $192 
for workers in the Arts/Entertainment sector, to a high of $462 for Professional/Scientific 
employees. Unsurprisingly, the across-industry correlation between average account balances and 
mean industry earnings from Table 2 is 0.92, which is consistent with employees in higher-paying 
industries making larger monthly contributions. 
 Table 4 summarizes the reasons that employees give for opting out from OregonSaves 
using the full sample rather than conditioning on the third month after registration. The top panel 
focuses on the options that employees were offered in our survey. Again, the most common reason 
cited for opting out is “I can’t afford to save at this time” (28.6% of all employees) and the second 
most common reason is “I have my own retirement plan” (23.9%). The third most common is 
“Other,” but with no additional details. The fourth most common is “I’m not interested in 
contributing through this employer.” which may indicate that the employee is working a part time 
or second job, or that the employee is not currently interested in saving for retirement. The bottom 
panel summarizes the open responses, which we manually assigned to a handful of categories. 






of responses related to eligibility (e.g., “I am no longer employed there” or “I will be leaving 
Oregon soon” or “I am too young to participate”) or the need for the program (“I am already 
retired” or “This is temporary work”). Slightly less than 1 percent objected to being automatically 
enrolled in the plan, and slightly less than 0.1 percent objected to the level of fees. 
Table 4 here 
If we assume that all OregonSaves-eligible workers with an existing retirement plan opt 
out of OregonSaves, then the 23.9% of respondents saying they have their own retirement plan 
implies that 9.7% (equals 23.9% times 117,345 divided by 289,657) of OregonSaves’ population 
already have an IRA or employer-sponsored retirement account. If we assume that only half of the 
workers with an existing retirement plan opt out, the fraction doubles to 19.4%, and it is still below 
the 22.1% implied by the 2014 SIPP. In either case, it is clear that a large majority of potential 
participants is unlikely to be saving for retirement outside of OregonSaves.   
 To explore heterogeneity in employee behavior regarding participation and account 
balances, we estimate a series of linear probability models. In Table 5, the dependent variable 
equals 100 if employee i formally opted out of OregonSaves within three months of the initial 
eligibility date, and zero otherwise, allowing us to interpret coefficients as increases in percentage 
points. Employee-level controls include age dummies (the reference group is age 18-25); account 
holder location indicators (the reference group is living in an urban Oregon zip code); dummy 
variables indicating whether this is the second or third (or more) time that the individual worked 
at an OregonSaves-covered employer; and an indicator of whether the employee terminated in or 
before month t. In all but one specification, we also control for the average unemployment rate 
over the prior three months in the Oregon (or Washington) county corresponding to the account-






natural logarithm of the number of employees in the month that the firm joins OregonSaves) and 
variables indicating whether the employer joined OregonSaves during the pilot phase; whether the 
employer registered after the OregonSaves deadline based on its firm size; and whether the 
employer had processed contributions for at least one employee through month t. Industry-level 
controls include median employee earnings within the industry in month t (as inferred by us) and 
the standard deviation of employee earnings within the industry in month t. Standard errors are 
clustered by employer. 
Table 5 here 
 The first column is restricted to employees who live in Oregon or Washington, allowing 
us to control for the average unemployment rate in the employee’s county over the prior three 
months. Column (2) includes an additional 4,520 employees who live outside of Oregon and 
Washington but are covered by OregonSaves, likely because their employers are based in Oregon. 
Columns (3) and (4) include industry fixed effects. Column (4) also includes the fraction of 
employee i's coworkers that had formally opted out as of month t-1. Column (5) replaces the 
industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects and drops any employer characteristics that are time-
invariant, as well as the industry income measures. All columns include year-month fixed effects.  
 Across all specifications, we find that older workers are significantly more likely to opt out 
than their younger counterparts. One interpretation is that older workers are more likely than 
younger workers to have their own retirement plans, reducing the need for additional savings. 
Another interpretation is that, because they are closer to retirement, they perceive less benefit from 
beginning to save. We also find that employees with prior exposure to OregonSaves are less likely 
to opt out, perhaps because they come to recognize the value of a portable retirement plan. 






much less likely to opt out, presumably because they see no need to opt out of a plan affiliated 
with an employer from whom they are no longer earning an income. The implication is that 
terminated workers will neither opt out from OregonSaves nor accumulate any savings. 
 With respect to employer characteristics, we find that employees in larger businesses are 
less likely to opt out. Employees working at employers that participated in the pilot program are 
also less likely to opt out, presumably because these employers were the most enthusiastic about 
introducing their employees to the OregonSaves program. Finally, employees whose employers 
demonstrate a level of cooperation with OregonSaves by processing contributions are generally 
less likely to opt out. The exception is that the coefficient becomes positive and marginally 
significant (at the 10-percent level) when we include employer fixed effects, suggesting that 
workers hired after the pilot-program employer begins processing payroll are more likely to opt 
out than the initial set of workers enrolled in OregonSaves. 
 As we found above, employees in industries with higher earnings (e.g., “Finance and 
Insurance” and “Information”) are also more likely to opt out. To the extent that they are already 
saving for retirement or have a concrete plan for doing so in the future, they have less need for a 
program like OregonSaves. At the same time, consistent with financial constraints, employees in 
industries with more volatile income (e.g., “Agriculture,” “Construction,” and “Real Estate”), and 
who live in counties with higher unemployment rates, are more likely to opt out. Neither income 
nor its volatility has explanatory power when we include industry fixed effects, suggesting that the 
relevant variation is across industry rather than within industry. 
 When we include the fraction of employees opting out at an employer in the prior month, 
we find a large significantly positive coefficient, and the R2 jumps from 0.104 to 0.275. One 






exclusive interpretation is that employers are influencing the opt out rate directly, perhaps by 
highlighting what they perceive to be problems with the program. 
 While Table 5 sheds light on the formal participation decision, it does not shed direct light 
on the accumulation of retirement assets, which is the ultimate goal of OregonSaves. Therefore, in 
Table 6, we use a similar set of linear probability models to predict positive account balances. The 
dependent variable equals 100 if an employee has a positive account balance three months after 
his initial eligibility date, and zero otherwise. Column (1) focuses on the 126,778 employees who 
live in Oregon or Washington and have not formally opted out through month three.26 The 
remaining columns are limited to employees whose employers have processed contributions. The 
independent variables and fixed effects mirror Table 5. Column (4) includes the fraction of 
employee’s coworkers with a positive account balance in the previous month.  
Table 6 here 
 Several of the findings here are consistent with those in Table 5. Older workers and workers 
in industries with higher median incomes are more likely to opt out, and less likely to have a 
positive balance. Similarly, workers being exposed to OregonSaves through a second job are less 
likely to opt out and more likely to have a positive balance. Nevertheless, many of the other 
findings are at odds. Employees at larger firms, employees living outside of Oregon, and 
employees at firms that participated in the pilot program are all less likely to opt out, but 
conditional on not opting out, are also less likely to hold a positive account balance. The same is 
true for employees that terminate before the end of the three-month window. In fact, the majority 
of employees neither opts out nor has a positive account balance within three months of eligibility. 
                                                 
26 By conditioning on not having formally opted out by month three, we are excluding some employees with positive 
account balances. However, the fraction of employees who do not opt out and have positive account balance is 42.5%, 






In part, this reflects the large number of employers that has not processed payroll for any of their 
employees, and, in part, it reflects employee turnover and withdrawals. However, the fact that pilot 
employers sought to participate in OregonSaves before they were required to do so makes the lack 
of positive account balances among employees hired after the pilot program all the more puzzling. 
At firms that processed payroll for employees, the employees are significantly more likely 
to have a positive account balance, a result that is largely mechanical. In column (4), we observe 
that positive account balances are strongly predicted by the proportion of positive balance accounts 
at the participant’s employer in the prior month. As in Table 5, this estimate could be driven by 
peer effects, in concert with transparent or opaque employer influences on employees’ 
participation. 
Overall, the findings in this section provide support for all three of the hypotheses that we 
offered at the outset to explain low retirement savings rates. Consistent with search costs, we find 
much higher participant rates among younger workers (who are likely less financially literate) and 
those being exposed to the OregonSaves program for the second or third time. Moreover, while 
our estimated participation rate ranges from 34.3% to 62.4%, it is important to remember that 
OregonSaves is targeting workers without access to a traditional employer-sponsored retirement 
plan, for whom the baseline retirement saving rate is near 0%. The hypothesis that low savings 
rates occur because people can’t afford to save also finds support. Opt out rates are increasing in 
the local unemployment rate and the volatility of industry income, and employees in industries 
with lower earnings are more likely to state that they cannot afford to save when opting out. In 
some sense, these opt out choices are reassuring, because they likely reflect an optimal decision to 
prioritize current consumption (for which the marginal utility is high) over savings. Finally, the 






consistent with the “don’t need to save” hypothesis. Older participants may have a more precise 
estimate of the social security replacement rate they will face at retirement, reducing the perceived 
value of participating in OregonSaves, and workers in higher income industries are the most likely 
to have a preexisting retirement savings plan.   
V. Evolution of Saving Rates 
 Turning to the distribution of saving rates, columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 again focus on 
employees three months after their initial eligibility month. Column (1) presents the distribution 
of contribution rates for all employees, including those who opted out of the program (for whom 
the saving rate is coded as 0%). We see that over 98% of employees have a saving rate of either 
0% or 5%. Column (2) excludes employees who have formally opted out. The fact that 3.9% of 
employees still have a saving rate of 0% implies that some employees informally opt out by setting 
their saving rate to 0% without ever formally notifying their employers that they are opting out. In 
columns (3) and (4), we examine the contribution rate for each employee-employer pair in each 
month, allowing us to incorporate information on saving rates in sample months after month three. 
Column (3) focuses on all employees, while column (4) focuses on employees who are active, 
eligible, have an open account, and have not formally opted out in month t. Comparing columns 
(2) and (4), we observe a decrease in the fraction of employees with a saving rate of 5% and an 
increase in the fractions with saving rates of 0%, 6%, and 7%. The increased use of 6% and 7% 
saving rates is particularly noticeable in column (4), reflecting the impact of automatic escalation 
of 1% additional saving, implemented every January. 
Table 7 here 
 Table 8 illustrates how contribution rates change from month to month. We focus on 






month (the sample in column (4) of Table 7). For each employee-employer-month, we create the 
pair (contribution rates at month t-1, contribution rate at month t).27 We then tabulate the number 
of pairs in each bin of the matrix with the current rate on the horizontal axis and the lagged 
contribution rate on the vertical axis. As expected, the diagonal of this matrix contains the largest 
number of participant month observations, implying that saving rate decisions are extremely 
sticky. Overall, the last two columns of Table 7 show that 2.8% of participant-months involve a 
contribution rate increase versus 2.0% that involve a decrease; much of this difference can be 
attributed to the automatic escalation feature of OregonSaves. Specifically, there are 23,394 cases 
where the saving rate rises from 5% to 6%, and another 5,204 cases where it increases from 6% to 
7%.28 In other words, while opt out rates are significantly higher in our sample than for higher-
paid employees of larger firms, the vast majority of those who do not opt out accept both the 
default saving rate and automatic escalation. Tables 7 and 8 are largely consistent with the search 
costs hypothesis, in that participants are willing to accept the default saving rate, conditional on 
participation. For those participants who do not wish to participate, there is clear evidence that 
they are capable of reducing their saving rates to zero.   
In sum, then, and consistent with prior research on the stickiness of default saving rates 
(e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001), we find that the vast majority of participating employees saves at 
the 5% default rate. Savings rates of 6% and 7% appear to be driven almost entirely driven by 
automatic escalation. In other words, we observe far more variation along the extensive margin 
(opting out) than along the intensive margin (saving rate). 
                                                 
27 We combine all contribution rates greater than 7% into a single category, as only a small fraction of people elect a 
rate higher than 7% over the period we examine. 
28 In Online Appendix Table 4, we show that rate increases are clustered on January 2019 and January 2020, the 






VI. Evolution of Account Balances 
 We conclude by exploring the dynamics of flows into and out of OregonSaves accounts. 
Table 9 and Figure 1 summarize the substantial growth of OregonSaves over our sample period. 
In August 2018, there were $6.7 million in assets and 86.4% of all dollars were invested in the 
default money market fund. While there have been steady outflows, they remain small relative to 
inflows, resulting in positive net inflows throughout the sample period. By April 2020, assets under 
management had grown to $51.0 million, and 58.1% of assets were invested in the money market 
fund. In November 2020 (outside of our sample period), total assets exceeded $79.1 million. The 
relatively high dollar outflows in the first quarter of 2020 may reflect concerns about COVID-19, 
but measured as a percent of assets, they are only slightly above average. The most striking change 
is the drop in total inflows in April 2020, which may reflect a sudden decline in earnings due to 
job loss. 
Table 9 and Figure 1 here 
 Table 10 focuses on account-level balances, inflows, and outflows. The number of open 
accounts increases more than 300% (from 19,078 to 77,007), while the number of open accounts 
with positive balances increases 280% (from 17,830 to 67,731). At the end of our study period, 
the average (positive) account balance is $754. The average net (non-zero) flow each month is 
$90, and the average inflow is $117. Outflows are far less common, but they are much larger in 
magnitude. The average outflow is $517. We plot monthly net flows, inflows, and outflows in 
Figure 1B. The rightmost column of Table 10 calculates the equal-weighted average asset 
allocation to the money market fund. Although 58.1% of OregonSaves’ plan dollars are invested 
in the money market fund, when we place equal weight on each account, the fraction rises to 






of whether it is desirable to default the first $1,000 into the money market fund. If the long-term 
goal is to allow participants to benefit from the market risk premium, an alternative design might 
transfer assets from the money market fund to an age-appropriate TDF after a prescribed period of 
time (e.g., three months).29 By contrast, if the goal were simply to provide an emergency savings 
account that participants could use to smooth consumption, retaining the account in safe 
investments would be a reasonable default. 
Table 10 here 
 Table 10 also illustrates the contrast between relatively stable outflows and the declining 
percentage of accounts with inflows over the sample period. Not surprisingly, the biggest drop in 
inflows occurs between March and April of 2020, when the economic effects of COVID closures 
were first enacted in Oregon. The general decline in the fraction of accounts with inflows is to be 
expected, since accounts enter our sample when an employment relationship begins and remain 
open without additional inflows when an employee is terminated or quits. However, to the extent 
that the portability features of OregonSaves are effective, the decline in inflows to accounts over 
time may be attenuated if employees move from one OregonSaves-participating employer to 
another. 
 In Figure 2A, we focus on employees who made at least one contribution into OregonSaves 
and who remain in our dataset for at least 3, 6, 12, or 18 months. We then plot the fraction of these 
participants making at least one contribution, contributions in two or more months, contributions 
in three or more months, etc. By construction, 100% of the participants make at least one 
contribution. Over a three-month horizon, the probability of three consecutive contributions is 
70%. When the horizon increases to six months, the probability of at least three contributions 
                                                 
29 Online Appendix Table 5 reports the fraction of plan assets invested in each fund and Online Appendix Table 6 






increases to 77%, but the probability of six consecutive contributions drops to 49%. Similarly, the 
probability of at least six contributions increases to 61% when the horizon rises to 12 months, but 
the probability of 12 consecutive contributions is only 30%. These patterns suggest either that a 
significant fraction of employees is opting out during the first 12 months in the program, or that 
their employment status is fluid. 
Figure 2 here 
 In Figure 2B, we focus on 6,053 employees who made at least one OregonSaves 
contribution and who remain in our sample for at least 18 months. We plot the fraction of 
participants classified as inactive in month t, the fraction with a saving rate of 0%, and the fraction 
classified as inactive or with a saving rate of 0%. The fraction classified as inactive rises from 4% 
(in the month of the initial contribution) to 38% in month 18, while the fraction with a saving rate 
of 0% rises from 6% to 21%. In other words, the fraction of employees able to contribute to 
OregonSaves through their employers is declining monotonically. The fact that 4% of the 
employees are classified as inactive in the same month that they make their first contribution into 
OregonSaves speaks to the high turnover rates. The fact that 6% of the employees have a saving 
rate of 0% at the end of the month may reflect a decision to opt out in response to a reduced 
paycheck. 
 In Tables 11 and 12, we document the significant impact of employee turnover rates on 
OregonSaves account balances. The unit of observation is account i in month t, and the sample is 
limited to the 59,043 participants who make at least one contribution into OregonSaves during our 
sample period. (We exclude anyone with a positive account balance in July 2018.) Table 11 reports 
the number of open accounts, fraction with a positive balance, fraction with any inflow or outflow, 






versus inactive. The fraction of accounts in which the employee is classified as active by at least 
one OregonSaves-covered employer falls from 96.8% in month one, to 61.5% in month 18. Among 
those classified as active, the average balance increases from $89 to $1,132, while the fraction of 
accounts with positive inflows decreases from 99.9% to 48.1%. The likelihood of any outflow 
averages around 2.9%. The fact that the likelihood of inflows falls below 50% within a sample of 
employees classified as active strongly suggests that the employee status flag is either not being 
updated by all employers, not being updated in a timely fashion, or both. 
Tables 11 and 12 here 
 Among those classified as inactive, the average balance increases from $203 to $370, while 
the fraction of accounts with positive inflows decreases from 99.8% to 4.4%. The likelihood of 
any outflow averages around 1.7%. The fact that the likelihood of inflows does not fall to zero 
suggests either that some employees return to work before their employee status is updated by 
their employer, or that some individuals contribute directly to their OregonSaves IRA despite not 
being currently employed by an OregonSaves-participating firm. To the extent that employees 
accumulate $370 in an OregonSaves Roth IRA and make no subsequent contributions or 
withdrawals, they may be unaware that they are participating in the program.30 
 While we find that younger employees are less likely to opt out and more likely to have a 
positive balance within three months of their initial eligibility date, our earlier analysis does not 
shed light on the rate at which assets are accumulated. In Table 12, we track employees in different 
age groups over time, from month 1 (when they make their first contribution into OregonSaves), 
to month 18. The left panel reports the fraction of participants within each age range classified as 
active in month t. The right panel reports the corresponding average account balances (including 
                                                 
30 In Table Online Appendix 7, we report the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of account balances for active 






zeroes), and we see that the likelihood of job turnover is decreasing with age. Only 50.7% of 
employees under the age of 26 are still active in month 18, versus 85.7% of those over the age of 
75. As a result, at the end of 18 months, the youngest employees have accumulated an average of 
$487, while the oldest employees have accumulated an average of $887. The highest average 
account balance is $1,186 for those between the ages of 56 and 65. In other words, while younger 
employees are more likely to participate, their ability to accumulate assets is hampered by high 
levels of job turnover.  It is also apparent in Table 12 that, while older participants may be less 
likely to participate, those who do participate accumulate assets at a higher rate than younger 
participants. 
 We conclude this section by predicting individual-level monthly inflows and outflows. The 
dependent variable in column (1) of Table 13 equals 100 if there is an inflow into the account in 
month t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dependent variable in column (2) equals 100 if there is 
any outflow from the account in month t, and zero otherwise. Since outflows are much lumpier 
than inflows, the likelihood of any inflow is 55.5%, while the likelihood of any outflow is only 
2.6%. To help quantify the impact of turnover and opt out on inflows and outflows, we include 
dummy variables to capture whether employees are listed as being actively employed in month t, 
whether they terminate during month t, whether they terminate during month t-1, and whether the 
saving rate equals 0% in month t (which reflect either a formal opt out or a direct change to the 
saving rate). We include age category fixed effects (reference category is age 18-25); the number 
of months since the initial contribution fixed effects; calendar year-month fixed effects; and 
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
Table 13 here 






active increases the likelihood of any inflow by 52.1% (which is close to the unconditional average 
of 55.5%). For those who terminate during month t, the coefficient is 24.3%, likely reflecting 
inflows during the month prior to the job turnover. Predictably, setting the saving rate to 0% is 
also associated with a reduced probability of any inflows. Controlling for employment status, we 
find that the likelihood of any inflow is decreasing in months since the initial contribution, falling 
by 25.9% in month 18. The most striking pattern with respect to the calendar year-month fixed 
effects is the decline of 13.9% in April 2020. It is conceivable that this reflects a significant loss 
of earnings due to COVID-19, one not yet captured by the employment status variable. Finally, 
while many of the coefficients on the industry fixed effects are large and negative (relative to the 
reference category of a missing industry code), only those for Arts/Entertainment and Business 
Support are statistically significant at the 10-percent level or below.  
 The linear probability model does a much poorer job predicting outflows. While the R-
squared in column (1) is 0.372, it is only 0.016 in column (2). The main predictors of outflows are 
recent job turnover, which may reflect the use of outflows to smooth consumption, and decision 
to set the saving rate to 0%. Younger participants are also slightly more likely to withdraw 
contributions than older participants. 
VII. Conclusion 
 We analyze participation decisions and the evolution of account balances in OregonSaves, 
the first state-sponsored auto IRA in the United States. We find that the program is serving 
employees across a range of industries, but primarily those with low wages and high turnover. The 
average participating employee in our sample earns $2,365 per month, has a within-person 
standard deviation of monthly earnings of $945, and an annual job turnover rate of 38.2%. 






significantly lower than in other settings. However, when assessing participation rates between 
34.3% and 62.4%, it is important to recall that OregonSaves targets workers lacking access to a 
traditional employer-sponsored retirement plan. Only 11% of the employees targeted by 
OregonSaves claim to already have retirement savings (half the 22% level in the nationally-
representative SIPP). For everyone else, the counterfactual retirement saving rate is near 0%. 
 In part, the lower participant rates are consistent with the “can’t afford to save” hypothesis. 
Opt out rates rise with the local unemployment rate and the volatility of industry income, and 
employees in industries with lower earnings are more likely to cite that they cannot afford to save 
when opting out. In a sense, these opt out choices are reassuring because they are likely to reflect 
an optimal decision to prioritize current consumption (for which the marginal utility is high) over 
savings. Relatedly, we observe withdrawals following job turnover, which is more common among 
younger workers, and, during April 2020, we observe a large drop in contributions that we attribute 
to COVID-19 related job losses and economic uncertainty.   
 Nonetheless, OregonSaves is generating savings for a substantial number of participants. 
Over 67,700 participants accumulated more than $51 million dollars through April 2020, resulting 
in an average account balance of $754. Consistent with a search costs rationale for the program, 
we see much higher participation rates among younger workers (who are likely less financially 
literate) and those being exposed to the OregonSaves program for the second or third time. Because 
we find very little variation in saving rates, dispersion in account balances is driven by variation 
in salaries and job tenure. Finally, we also find evidence of the “don’t need to save” hypothesis, in 
that older workers and workers in industries with higher income levels perceive less benefit to 
participating in OregonSaves.  






eliminating search costs. Nevertheless, we have also identified limits to what automatic-enrollment 
savings plans can achieve when expanded to workers in industries and firms with low wages, 
volatile wages, and high turnover rates. Specifically, there is reason to believe that at least part of 
the liquid savings generated by employee contributions were drawn down to smooth consumption 
during the pandemic. This is not to undermine the value of the saving program; rather it highlights 
the key role that OregonSaves accounts are playing for lower-paid workers in times of earnings 
and employment volatility. Less clear is whether these accounts will eventually grow into 
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Figure 1. Growth in OregonSaves, August 2018 through April 2020 
Panel A reports total assets under management in OregonSaves at the end of each month, in millions of 
dollars. Panel B reports equal-weighted average (non-zero) account balances, inflows, and outflows. 







Figure 2. Reductions in the Likelihood of Contributions over Time 
Panel A focuses on workers who have made at least one contribution into OregonSaves during our sample 
period and reports the fraction making at least X contributions over 3, 6, 12, and 18 month periods. Panel 
B focuses on the 18-month sample and reports the fraction of workers who are classified as inactive in the 
months following the initial contribution, set their saving rate to 0%, or both. Source: Authors calculations; 







Table 1: Growth of OregonSaves, August 2018 – April 2020 
In this table, we summarize the growth of OregonSaves. The unit of observation in columns (1) and (2) is the employer. We report the total number of employers 
that have uploaded employees’ information to the OregonSaves administrator during or before month t, and the subset of employers that have processed 
contributions for at least one employee. The unit of observation in the remaining columns is the employer-employee pair. Column (3) reports the total number of 
employees uploaded to the administrator and column (4) reports the subset working at employers that have processed contributions. Column (5) reports the number 
of employees who are classified by the administrator as both eligible to participate and actively working, and column (6) reports the subset working at employers 
that have processed contributions. Column (7) reports the number of employees in column (3) with positive account balances in month t and column (8) reports 
the number that ever have a positive account balance. Because employee identifiers are unique to employee-employer pairs, and because some individual work for 
multiple employers over our sample period, the number of employees with accounts overstates the number of accounts. Finally, we report two participation rates. 
The global participation rate is defined as the number of employees with current positive account balances (column (7)) divided by the total number of employees 
(column (4)). The feasible participation rate is defined as the number of employees who ever have a positive account balance (column (8)) divided by the number 






Table 2: OregonSaves Employees by Industry 
In this table, we provide employee-level summary statistics by industry and within the full sample of employees. “All” corresponds to column (6) of Table 1; 
“Eligible & Active & Contributions” corresponds to column (6). Statistics are reported for the “All” sample. Age is defined as the calendar year in which the 
employee first appears in the administrative data minus the stated year of birth. We report the mean, median, and interquartile range. We report two measures of 
turnover. Annual turnover equals one if the employee was classified as “terminated,” “seasonal layoff,” or “out of business” twelve months after becoming eligible 
to contribute (one observation per employee with at least twelve months of administrative data). Similarly, monthly turnover equals one if the employee was 
“active” in month t-1 but “terminated,” “seasonal layoff,” or “out of business” in month t (unit of observations is employee-month). Monthly after-tax earnings are 
estimated at the employee-month level as total monthly contributions divided by current savings rate (e.g., $100 / 5% = $2,000). Monthly earnings can only be 
estimated for the subset of contributors. We report the mean, median, and interquartile range. Finally, we report the within-employee standard deviation of monthly 








Table 3: OregonSaves Opt-Out Rates and Initial Account Balances by Industry 
In this table, the unit of observation is employee i three months after the date on which the employee would be eligible to contribute to OregonSaves (where the 
eligibility date is set under the assumptions that her identify is verified and she remains employed). We report the number of employees in column (1). The focus 
on each employee during this particular month explains the reduced sample size relative to Tables 1 and 2. Column (2) reports the fraction of these employees who 
have formally opted out of OregonSaves within three months of eligibility. Columns (3) and (4) condition the sample on having opted out and report the fraction 
that list the reason for opting out as “I can't afford to save at this time” or “I have my own retirement plan,” respectively. Columns (5), (6), and (7) report the 
fractions of all employees without an account (which includes the vast majority of employees who opt out), with an account balance of $0, or with a positive 
account balance. The remaining columns focus on the subset of employees with positive account balances after three months of eligibility and report the mean, 







Table 4: Reasons for Formally Opting Out of OregonSaves 
In this table, we summarize the reasons that employees give for formally opting out of OregonSaves. Employees who 
opt out are presented with a list of seven reasons (“I can't afford to save at this time” through “I'm not satisfied with 
the investment options”) and asked to choose one. Employees were also allowed to choose “Other” and fill out an 
open response. Of the 31,284 employees who choose “Other.” 8,836 provide a comment. After classifying the 8,836 
comments into narrow categories, we determined that 726 of the comments matched one of the seven prespecified 
reasons. The most popular of the remaining 8,110 comments are summarized in the lower panel. Differences between 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 and “I can't afford to save” and “I have my own retirement plan” in this table are driven 










Table 5: Predicting Opt Out from OregonSaves 
In this table, we estimate linear probability models to predict opt out from OregonSaves. The unit of observation is 
employee i. The dependent variable equals 100 if employee i has formally opted out of OregonSaves three months 
after her initial eligibility date, and zero otherwise. Employee-level independent variables include age category 
dummy variables (omitted category is ages 18-25); account holder location dummy variables (omitted category is 
account holder lives in an urban Oregon zip code); OregonSaves job number 2 or 3+ dummy variables; and an 
employee i terminated in or before month t dummy variable. Employer-level variables include firm size (natural 
logarithm of the number of employees when enrolling) and dummy variables indicating whether the employer joined 
OregonSaves during the pilot phase, whether the employer registered after the OregonSaves deadline based on firm 
size, and whether the employer has processed payroll for at least one employee through month t. Industry-level 
variables include median employee income within the industry in month t and standard deviation of employee income 
within the industry in month t. Columns that controls for the average unemployment rate in the account holder’s 
county over the prior three months are limited to employees living in Oregon and Washington. Column (4) includes 
the fraction of employee i's coworkers that had formally opted out in month t-1. All columns include year-month fixed 
effects. Columns (3) and (4) include industry fixed effects. Standard errors cluster on employer. Statistical significance 
















Table 6: Predicting Positive Account Balances 
In this table, we estimate linear probability models to predict positive OregonSaves account balances conditional on 
not having formally opted out. The unit of observation is employee i. The dependent variable equals 100 if employee 
i has a positive account balance three months after her initial eligibility date, and zero otherwise. Employee-level 
independent variables include age category dummy variables (omitted category is ages 18-25); account holder location 
dummy variables (omitted category is account holder lives in an urban Oregon zip code); OregonSaves job number 2 
or 3+ dummy variables; and an employee i terminated in or before month t dummy variable. Employer-level 
independent variables include firm size (natural logarithm of the number of employees when enrolling) and dummy 
variables indicating whether the employer joined OregonSaves during the pilot phase, whether the employer registered 
after the OregonSaves deadline based on firm size, and whether Industry-level independent variables include median 
employee income within the industry in month t and the standard deviation of employee income within the industry 
in month t. Column (1) includes the full sample of employees and includes the control for whether the employer has 
processed payroll for at least on employee through month t; columns (2) through (4) includes only employees for 
whom this variable equals one. Column (4) includes the fraction of employee i's coworkers that had a positive account 
balance in month t-1. All columns include year-month fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) include industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors cluster on employer. Statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels is 















Table 7: Distribution of OregonSaves Contribution Rates 
In this table, we describe the distribution of OregonSaves contribution rates. In columns (1) and (2), we focus on the sample of employees three months after the 
initial eligibility date, with one observation per employee. Because employees who opt out have a contribution rate of 0%, column (2) excludes employees who 
have formally opted out. In columns (3) and (4), the unit of observation is employee-month. Column (3) focuses on the entire sample of employee-months while 










Table 8: Frequency of Monthly Changes in Contribution Rates among Active, Eligible Employees with Open Accounts 
In this table, we provide evidence on persistence in contribution rates across months. Similar to column (4) of Table 7, the unit of observation is employee-month 
and the sample is limited to employees who are active, eligible, have an open account, and have not formally opted out in month t-1. For each lagged contribution 
rate, we report the number of employee-months with the current contribution rate, as well as the percent decreasing or increasing their contribution rate. Because 
















Table 9: Growth of OregonSaves, August 2018 – April 2020 
The sample is limited to open accounts in month t. We report the total number of dollars invested in OregonSaves at the end of each month, as well as the total net 
flows (inflows minus outflows), inflows, and outflows during the month. Percent net flow is the net flow during month t scaled by total assets in month t-1. Percent 
inflow and outflow are defined similarly. The “% Liquid Reserve” is the fraction of all OregonSaves assets invested in the State Street Institutional Liquid Reserve 








Table 10: Account-Level OregonSaves Summary Statistics by Month, August 2018 – April 2020 
The sample is limited to open accounts in month t. The unit of observation is the account of participant i. We report the number of open accounts, the number of 
open accounts with a positive balance at the end of month t, the average account balance at the end of month t (excluding zeros), the fraction of accounts with any 
inflow, any outflow, or both an inflow and an outflow during month t, the average net flow, inflow, and outflow during month t (excluding zeros), and the average 
fraction of account balances invested in the State Street Institutional Liquid Reserve Fund, the default investment option for the first $1,000 in OregonSaves 









Table 11: Evolution of Account Balances Based on Employee Status 
In this table, the unit of observation is account i in month t. We limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution is August 2018 or later (which explains 
why the number of open accounts in the first column is less than 70,077). We begin following an account when it makes its first contribution into OregonSaves 
and then track the account forward up to 18 months. Because the number of OregonSaves participants is growing over time, we necessarily have fewer observations 
as we move from month t of the initial contribution to month t+17. The fraction of participants classified by (one or more of their employers) as active at the end 
of month t falls from 96.8% to 61.5%. We report account statistics separately for active and inactive employees. For example, 11 months after their initial 
contribution into OregonSaves there are 16,508 OregonSaves participants classified as active (at one or more employers) and 7,109 classified as inactive. We report 
the fraction of open accounts with positive balances, with any inflows during the month, with any outflows during the month, and average balance at the end of the 










Table 12: Employee Status and Average OregonSaves Account Balance 
In this table, the unit of observation is account i in month t. As in Table 11, we limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution is August 2018 or later. 
We begin following an account when it makes its first contribution into OregonSaves and then track the account forward up to 18 months. Each month, we report 
the fraction of participants classified by (one or more of their employers) as active at the end of month t and the average account balance, separately by age range. 







Table 13: Predicting Any Monthly Inflows and Outflows 
In this table, we estimate linear probability models to predict any monthly inflows and outflows. The unit of 
observation is the account of employee i in month t. We limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution 
is August 2018 or later. The dependent variable in column (1) equals 100 if there is any inflow into the account in 
month t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dependent variable in column (2) equals 100 if there is any outflow from 
the account in month t, and zero otherwise. We include dummy variables to capture whether the employee is listed as 
being actively employed, whether they were terminated during month t (which reflect either a formal opt out decision 
or a direct change to the saving rate). We include age category fixed effects (omitted category is ages 18-25); months 
since the initial contribution fixed effects; date fixed effects; and industry fixed effects. Standard errors cluster on 
employer. Statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5- percent, and 10-percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, 















Online Appendix Table 1: Coverage of Pension Plans and IRAs among SIPP Survey 
Respondents 
In this table, we show the fraction of individuals that having a pension plan or an IRA in the sample of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Data come from the 2014 Social Security Administration Supplement Data, 
which is part of the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Panel A shows the percent of SIPP 
survey respondents not included in an employment-based pension plan. Pension Plans include defined-benefit plans, 
401(k)s, and 403(b)s. About 30% of SIPP respondents did not have access to an employment-based pension plan in 
2014. Panel B presents, of all workers without access to an employment-based pension plan, 7.5% of workers had an 
IRA and were actively contributing to their IRA account. Another 14.5% of workers had an IRA but were not actively 
contributing. About 78% of workers did not have a pension plan or an IRA. Panel C compares selected socioeconomic 
characteristics between workers covered by OregonSaves and SIPP respondents not included in a pension plan. The 
average age for both groups is 37. Average monthly earnings are $2,887 (before-tax) for OregonSaves workers and 
$2,933 (before-tax) for SIPP respondents lacking access to a pension plan. Pre-tax earnings for OregonSaves workers 
are computed using the after-tax earnings imputed from the OregonSaves data, the marginal federal tax rate in 2019, 
and the marginal state tax rate in Oregon in 2019. Monthly earnings are more volatile for OregonSaves workers than 
SIPP respondents. Following the previous literature summarized in Hannagan and Morduch (2015), we calculate  
income volatility as the standard deviation of monthly earnings divided by average monthly earnings. Previous studies 
found that the income volatility measure is usually between 0.15 and 0.45. To calculate the income volatility for 
OregonSaves workers who still participated in the OS program in April 2020, we use their imputed monthly earnings 
records in 2019 to minimize the impact of the COVID-19 on income volatility in 2020. For SIPP respondents, we use 








Online Appendix Table 2: OregonSaves Opt-Out Rates Over Time 
In this table, the unit of observation is employee i in the initial month in which the employee would be eligible to 
contribute into OregonSaves (where the eligibility date is set under the assumptions that her identify is verified and 
she remains employed) and over the following twelve months. We report opt out rates for the full sample of employees 
for whom we possess data in month t, and separately for employees for whom accounts were and were not opened. 
Differences across account status reflect the fact that formally opting out of OregonSaves reduces the likelihood that 
an account is ever opened. Note that the 40.9% overall opt out rate in month three matches the full-sample rate in the 


























Online Appendix Table 3: OregonSaves Opt-Out Rates by Month 
In this table, the unit of observation is employee i three months after the data on which the employee would be eligible 
to contribute into OregonSaves (under the assumptions that she has her identify verified and remains employed). We 
exclude employees who become eligible before July 2018 (because we lack data on the timing of opt out before August 
2018) or after January 2020 (because the administrative data end in April 2020). We exclude the small number of 
employees for whom an eligibility date is missing (typically because the employer is classified as “Exempt”). We do 
not condition on the employee being classified as active or having an open account. Note that the 40.9% overall opt 
















Online Appendix Table 4: Likelihood of Increasing or Decreasing Contribution Rate, by 
Month 
In this table, we report the fractions of employees who have not formally opted out of OregonSaves in month t-1 that 
(a) increase their contribution rate in month t, decrease their contribution rate in month t without formally opting out, 
and decreasing their contribution rate in month t by formally opting out. We do not impose any other filters on the 
sample. Because our contribution rate date begins in August 2018, the first month for which we can measure changes 
is September 2018. The vast majority of the increases in January 2019 and January 2020 are due to automatic 















Online Appendix Table 5: Aggregate Asset Allocation Snapshots, August 2018 – April 2020 
In this table, we report the aggregate number of dollars invested in each investment option on four different dates: August 2018, December 2018, December 2019, 
and April 2020. The State Street Target Retirement 2015 Fund merged into State Street Target Retirement Fund during March 2020. The State Street Target 













Online Appendix Table 6: Fund Returns and Flows, August 2018 – April 2020 
In this table, we report summary statistics for the investment options available through OregonSaves. The unit of observation is fund i in month t and the sample 
is limited to the period August 2018 to April 2020. The outflows from the State Street Institutional Liquid Reserve Fund in February 2020 are driven by exchanges 
into the target retirement funds. The State Street Target Retirement 2015 Fund merged into State Street Target Retirement Fund during March 2020. The State 









Online Appendix Table 7: Dispersion of OregonSaves Account Balances Based on Employee Status 
In this table, the unit of observation is account i in month t. We limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution is August 2018 or later (which explains 
why the number of open accounts in the first column is less than 70,077). We begin following an account when it makes its first contribution into OregonSaves 
and then track the account forward up to 18 months. Because the number of OregonSaves participants is growing over time, we necessarily have fewer observations 
as we move from month t of the initial contribution to month t+17. The fraction of participants classified by (one or more of their employers) as active at the end 
of month t falls from 96.8% to 61.5%. We report the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of OregonSaves account balance separately for active and inactive 
employees. Source: Authors calculations; see text. 
 
 
 
